Decision Sciences Journal
Volume 29, Number 1
Winter 1998

Managerial Influences on Intraorganizational Information Technology Use: A Principal-Agent Model

Anol Bhattacherjee
Information Systems, College of Business and Administration, University of Colorado at Denver, Campus Box 165, P.O. Box 173364, Denver, CO 80217-3364, email: anol@castle.cudenver.edu

Abstract: Our current understanding of information technology (IT) usage does not explain why and how managers can influence organizational members to use a new IT. Drawing on principal-agent research, this paper develops and tests a model of intraorganizational IT usage that addresses this important issue. Managerial incentives and control are examined as important components of managerial influences, which are linked to IT usage via a principal-agent model (PAM). Seven research hypotheses are generated from this model and empirically tested using a laboratory experiment. Results of the study indicate that managers can promote IT usage within organizations by designing appropriate incentives and control structures such as monitoring and multiple-period contracts. However, the effectiveness of these structures will depend on potential users’ ability to distinguish between various forms of incentives and control.

Subject Areas: Agency Theory, End-User Computing, Incentives, IS Implementation, and IS Use.